Grande Region Security and Reliability Day 2017
March 9, 2017 – University of Luxembourg
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| 9:00 – 9:30 | Registration |
| 9:30 – 9:35 | Welcome |
| 9:35 – 11:05 | Session 1: Cryptography |
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Jose M. Lopez, Marjan Skrobot and Vincenzo Iovino.
On the Relation Between SIM and IND-RoR Security Models for PAKEs |
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Daniel Dinu, Alex Biryukov, Johann Großschädl, Dmitry Khovratovich, Yann Le Corre and Léo Perrin.
FELICS – Fair Evaluation of Lightweight Cryptographic Systems |
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Michael Backes, Amir Herzberg, Aniket Kate and Ivan Pryvalov.
Touch-or-Change: Multi-User Privacy and Integrity in Universally Re-randomizable Encryption |
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Daniel Dinu, Léo Perrin, Aleksei Udovenko, Vesselin Velichkov, Johann Großschädl and Alex Biryukov.
Design Strategies for ARX with Provable Bounds: SPARX and LAX. |
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Sjouke Mauw, Jorge Toro-Pozo and Rolando Trujillo-Rasua.
On the Optimality of Secure Distance Bounding |
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Gina Gallegos-Garcia, Vincenzo Iovino, Alfredo Rial, Peter Roenne and Peter Ryan.
(Universal) Unconditional Verifiability in E-Voting without Trusted Parties |
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| 11:05 – 11:30 | Coffee break |
| 11:30 – 12:30 | Invited Talk |
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Dominique Unruh Fiat-Shamir and the Quantum Forking Conjecture |
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Abstract: Fiat-Shamir is a popular construction in classical cryptography for constructing signature schemes (and non-interactive proof systems). However, when considering security against quantum attackers, the security of Fiat-Shamir is largely unknown; all we know are negative results for various cases. In the present talk, we show progress towards a security proof for Fiat-Shamir. We introduce a new conjecture, the "Quantum Forking Conjecture" (QFC). The QFC is a problem in quantum query complexity. We show that if the QFC holds, then Fiat-Shamir is secure. This reduces a complex cryptographic question (involving quantum polynomial-time adversaries etc.) to a (hopefully simpler) query complexity problem. |
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| 12:30 – 14:00 | Lunch |
| 14:00 – 15:30 | Session 2: Security Protocols and Privacy |
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Jannik Dreier, Charles Duménil, Steve Kremer and Ralf Sasse.
Beyond Subterm-Convergent Equational Theories in Automated Verification of Stateful Protocols |
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Véronique Cortier, Niklas Grimm, Joseph Lallemand and Matteo Maffei.
A Type System for Protocol Equivalence |
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Kushal Babel, Vincent Cheval and Steve Kremer.
On Communication Models When Verifying Equivalence Properties |
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Michael Backes, Manuel Gomez-Rodriguez, Praveen Manoharan and Bartlomiej Surma.
Reconciling Privacy and Utility in Continuous-Time Diffusion Networks |
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Michael Backes, Jannik Dreier, Steve Kremer and Robert Künnemann.
A Novel Approach for Reasoning about Liveness in Cryptographic Protocols and its Application to Fair Exchange |
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Marcos Cramer and Giovanni Casini.
Postulates for Revocation Schemes |
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| 15:30 – 16:00 | Coffee break |
| 16:00 – 17:30 | Session 3: Software, System and Network Security |
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Michael Backes, Joerg Hoffmann, Robert Künnemann, Patrick Speicher and Marcel Steinmetz.
Simulated Penetration Testing and Mitigation Analysis |
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Marcus Völp, Jérémie Decouchant, Francisco Rocha, Vincent Rahli and Paulo Verissimo.
Towards more Secure and Available SGX Enclaves - Enclave-Side Preemption Control |
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Marten Oltrogge, Yasemin Acar, Michael Backes, Sascha Fahl and Christian Stransky.
When Laziness Snaps Back - The Impact of Code Generators on App (In)Security |
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Matthias Höschele, Alexander Kampmann and Andreas Zeller.
Mining Input Grammars for Massive Security Testing |
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Michael Backes, Sven Bugiel, Jie Huang and Oliver Schranz.
The ART of App Compartmentalization: Compiler-based Library Privilege Separation on Stock Android |
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Ivana Vukotic, Vincent Rahli, Marcus Voelp and Paulo Verissimo.
Formalizing Differential Dynamic Logic in Coq |